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The Underlying Reasons of the Low Rate of Criminal Witness Testifying in China 
 
Abstract: To ensure that witnesses testify in court, the National People's Congress 
(NPC) created large-scale modifications in witnesses testifying system when amending 
the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C) (1996 
Revision) in 2012. Theoretical circles generally believe that a perfect witness testifying 
system can help witnesses to testify in court. China’s witnesses testifying system has 
made remarkable progress from the legal text in 2012. However, judging from the judicial 
practice in recent years, the proportion of criminal witnesses appearing in court has not 
been significantly improved. The underlying cause of the unexpected situation is not the 
various defects of witness testifying system in China itself, but the operating environment 
of witness testifying system. Further speaking, whether high or low, the proportion of 
criminal witnesses appearing in court has no substantive impact on the criminal trial. 
Especially in cases where criminal trial become formalistic, many people’s courts do not 
need witnesses to testify in court. 
Key Words: New criminal procedure law; witness testifying system; the low rate of criminal 
witness testifying. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In modern criminal procedure, a witness testifying in court is an important 
guarantee to a fair trial. On the one hand, a witness testifying in court is helpful for a 
judge to make more an accurate judgment on the basis of finding out the truth. On the 
other hand, a defendant and his or her defense counsels can cross-examine a witness face 
to face when the witness testifies in court. If a witness refuses to testify before court, it 
not only may cause a judge to make an error judgment but also directly deprives a 
defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness face to face. The defendant will have a strong 
sense of injustice because his or her right has been violated. Moreover, this may affect the 
acceptability of criminal jurisdiction. With respect to China’s criminal procedure, a 
witness testifying in court is both an important measure to realize a fair trial and a key 
factor whether China’s adversary system reform succeeds. 
Although the theoretical community always thinks that the cross-examination 
between the prosecution and the defense help both to maintain procedural justice and to 
find out the truth, and has given high expectations to the witness testifying system since 
criminal trial mode reform in the mid-1990s, it is very disappointing for them that 
witnesses generally did not testify in court in the process of implementing the revised 
Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) of 1996. According to data obtained from the Supreme 
People's Court, the rate of criminal witness testimony in court does not exceed 10% in 
first instance criminal cases, and this rate does not exceed 5% in second instance criminal 
cases. Some media report that the rate of witness testimony in court is only from 1% to 5% 
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in China. Under such circumstances, the witness testifying system became a hot topic in 
the theoretical field. Theoretical circles universally attributed the too low rate of witness 
testimony in court to the institutional level, such as the imperfect witness protection 
system, the lack of compensation or sanction system for a witness and the hearsay rule. 
Under this background, China began to create a large-scale reform for the criminal 
witness testifying system. Obviously, since the 5th Session of the Eleventh NPC adopted 
the Decision on Amending the 1996 CPL (P. R. C) on March 14, 2012, China’s witnesses 
testifying system has changed enormously and made remarkable progress from the legal 
text. To go further, the 2012 CPL (P. R. C) not only improved the witness protection 
system and added several protective measures, but also for the first time at the legal level 
stipulated the witness compensation system, the compulsory testifying system for a 
witness, and the sanction system for a witness who refuses to testify in court. For these 
reasons, all sectors of society regard the amendment of the witness testifying system as 
one of the highlights of the amended 2012 CPL (P. R. C). 
Although all sectors of society have expressed praise for China’s criminal witness 
testifying system reform, judging from the implementing of the amended 2012 CPL (P. R. 
C), the proportion of criminal witnesses appearing in court has not been significantly 
improved. In the process of criminal trial, both the prosecution and the defense still 
adduce and cross-examine the written witness testimony records made by the 
investigating authorities in court as usual. Why do witnesses still generally not testify in 
court in the case that China’s witness testifying system has been continuously improved? 
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In my opinion, the underlying cause of the unexpected situation is not the various defects 
of witness testifying system in China itself, but the operating environment of witness 
testifying system. Further speaking, although the perfect witness testifying system helps 
to promote witnesses to testify in court, the low rate of criminal witness testifying is only 
a superficial phenomenon, and the imperfection of the witness testifying system is not a 
fundamental reason for witnesses not to testify in court. Actually, the underlying reason 
of this phenomenon that witnesses do usually not testify in court is whether high or low, 
the proportion of criminal witnesses appearing in court has no substantive impact on the 
criminal trial. Especially in cases where criminal trial become formalistic, many people’s 
courts do not need witnesses to testify in court, and even artificially prevent witnesses 
from appearing in court to testify. In this circumstance, if we did not study the deep-
seated problems behind, but simply attribute the low rate of criminal witness testifying 
to the imperfection of the witness testifying system, and hope to increase the proportion 
of witnesses appearing in court to testify by improving the witness testifying system, this 
would definitely become a wishful thinking. In view of this, this paper no longer intends 
to analyze how to modify China’s criminal witness testifying system, but to discuss its 
four deep-level dilemmas in judicial practice. 
 
2. Mutual Coordination among Investigative organs, Procuratorates and Courts 
In modern criminal procedure, the interrelationship among investigators, 
procuratorates and courts affects not only the impartiality of the process of criminal 
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procedure but also the final outcome of criminal procedure. After all, the criminal 
procedure is a prosecution activity provoked to citizens by the country in the name of the 
overall interests of society. Meanwhile, criminal investigative authorities, procuratorial 
organizations and adjudication organizations are representatives of the State to exercise 
the corresponding state power. In criminal procedural activities, if the relationship 
among the above organizations cannot be rationalized, legitimate rights and interests of 
a defendant may be violated at any time, and the defendant will become a tool used to 
punish crimes. 
Since the founding of New China, the principle of “separation of functions, mutual 
coordination, and mutual checks” has always been regarded as the basic norm of mutual 
relations among a public security authority, a People's Procuratorate and a People's Court 
in China. According to traditional theory, this principle as the basic norm of constitution 
and the basic principle of CPL in China is not only the result of summing up judicial 
experience with Chinese characteristics but also the creation of following the guidance of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. On the basis of this principle, although a 
public security authority, a People's Procuratorate and a People's Court respectively 
stand for three different functions, namely, criminal investigations, prosecution and 
criminal trial, they are all politico-legal organizations and criminal judicial authorities on 
behalf of the State to exercise judicial power, and they commonly shoulder the task of 
punishing crimes. Admittedly, this arrangement is rational when the legal and judicial 
systems were not yet fully built in the early period of New China. However, with the 
JOURNAL OF STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 31 
continuous progress of the socialist legal system and the boom in human rights protection 
and procedural justice, the principle has been exposed to more and more problems. In 
point of a witness testifying in court, if nothing has been done to the above principle, it is 
difficult for a People’s Court to exclude the testimony stated by a witness in the 
investigative stage and firmly request the witness to testify in court. This is because under 
the influence of the above principle, in order to successfully complete shared 
responsibility of punishing crimes, a public security authority, a People's Procuratorate 
and a People's Court often form a common interest community of punishing crimes in 
criminal procedural activities. Because the common interest community aims at 
punishing crimes, the necessary of a witness testifying in court falls off remarkably. 
First, in order to successfully achieve the common purpose of punishing crimes, the 
above three criminal judicial authorities often take how to accurately identify criminal 
facts as the primary issue in criminal procedural activities rather than whether the 
evidence is obtained or adopted by justified means. In this case, as long as they can 
accurately identify criminal facts and make sure that there is no obvious error in the final 
outcome of criminal procedure in judicial practice, it can be tolerated and given a 
reasonable explanation for a public prosecutor to read out the records of testimony of 
witnesses made by investigative authorities in court. Under the underlying rule of “so 
long as a punishment is correct, it can be negligible whether the procedure is legitimate 
or not”, the legal supervision of a People's Procuratorate and the criminal trial of a 
People's Court usually give way to the need of punishing crimes. In this case, a People's 
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Court often turns a blind eye to the adducing pattern of a People's Procuratorate and still 
uses the records of testimony of witnesses adduced by the People's Procuratorate and 
which belongs to hearsay evidence as a basis of criminal judgment, and loses interest in 
summoning a witness to testify in court. Particularly, to prevent a witness from bringing 
some troubles of overthrowing his or her testimony when appearing before court, the 
court does not want him or her to testify, and even deliberately keeps a witness from 
testifying in court. 
Secondly, in the common interest community of punishing crimes, a People's Court 
not only need hear and decide criminal cases, but also shall coordinate with a People's 
Procuratorate and a criminal investigative authority in order to complete their common 
task of punishing crimes, which makes a People’s Court often deviate from the neutral 
status and show a certain desire to prosecute in judicial practice. A People’s Court has 
actually evolved into a third prosecutor following a criminal investigative authority and 
a People's Procuratorate in this case. In other words, a People’s Court should be the last 
bastion of social justice, but it usually stands together with an investigative authority and 
a People's Procuratorate and becomes the last defense line of criminal judicial authorities 
punishing crimes. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the People’s Court can exclude a 
witness’s testimony obtained by investigative authorities and which is very helpful to 
prove criminal facts without any pressure, and force a witness to testify in court. 
Especially when the People's Court reposes too much confidence in the records of 
testimony of witnesses in response to the pressures from the People's Procuratorate and 
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the public security organ, even though a witness can testify in court, the People's Court 
is unwilling to adopt a statement of a witness who is in court. In this case, a witness 
testifying in court will lose its due role in protecting a fair trial because of its formalism. 
Finally, from fair trial perspective, a People’s Court shall review the admissibility of 
a witness’s testimony submitted by a People’s Procuratorate, and exclude the 
inadmissible witness’s testimony. However, since the above three criminal judicial 
authorities have formed a common interest community of punishing crimes, it is also 
difficult to imagine that the People’s Court can be freed from the yoke of how to 
accurately identify criminal facts and correctly make a judgment or from the chain of 
punishing crimes together in order to provide necessary space for the application of 
hearsay rule or a witness testifying system. 
 
3. The Distortion of Criminal Procedure Structure 
In modern criminal procedure, though a judicial process seems the same from 
criminal investigation to prosecution and from prosecution to trial, the scientific structure 
of criminal procedure should center on the criminal trial procedure. On the one hand, 
based on the presumption of innocence and the function of dispute resolution, the 
criminal trial is the final and most important procedure in determining the fate of the 
accused. On the other hand, a criminal court is a “sound proof room” free from invasion 
by a variety of external factors. Moreover, it adopts the means that conform to procedural 
justice, such as the fair play between the prosecution and the defense, the common 
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participation of the main parties and public hearing. Hence, compared to the unilateral 
prosecution of prosecution authorities for a suspect or a defendant, the results of criminal 
trial are more authoritative and acceptable without doubt. In the criminal procedure 
structure centered on the criminal trial procedure, although prosecution authorities have 
enough judicial resources, strong national backing and people’s moral support, the 
legality and legitimacy of their prosecution activities must be subject to judicial review 
and control of the court. In contrast with strong prosecution authorities, the accused are 
in a very weak position, but they enjoy a series litigation rights and constitutional rights 
to prevent the abuse of prosecution organs. Once these rights are subject to illegal 
invasion of prosecution organs, the accused may seek corresponding judicial remedies to 
courts. Moreover, through the mechanism of judicial review, the court can take 
appropriate procedural sanctions for the improper prosecution activities of prosecution 
organs and deprive the improper interests obtained by prosecution organs through the 
improper prosecution activities. 
It is obvious that the criminal procedure structure centered on the criminal trial 
procedure is the important foundation of application of the hearsay rule and a witness 
testifying system. The reason is that it will be possible to form a virtuous cycle movement 
among a prosecution party, a defense party and a judge. To ensure the success of 
prosecution, the prosecution organs must try to prosecute through legal or justified 
means. Even if the legitimate rights and interests of a defense are violated by the 
prosecution organs, he or she can obtain corresponding judicial remedies through the 
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channels within the judicial system. A court dares to exclude inadmissible evidence 
which objectively plays an important role to prove criminal facts by virtue of its 
authoritative status, and this will contribute to the cyclical running of prosecution 
activities on the legal track. 
However, under the influence of the principle of “separation of functions, mutual 
coordination, and mutual checks”, it does not produce a positive interactive relationship 
between the above three criminal judicial authorities, but forms the criminal procedure 
structure centered on the pretrial procedure through a flow process in China. On the one 
hand, a public security authority, a People's Procuratorate and a People's Court are 
independently and respectively engaged in judicial actions in the criminal investigation 
and the criminal trial. Because these three stages balance each other in criminal procedure, 
it is difficult for the criminal trial to become the center of criminal procedure. In this case, 
it is hard for a People’s Court to implement a truly effective judicial control and judicial 
review to the investigative and prosecution activities of a public security authority and a 
People's Procuratorate. On the other hand, based on the common aim and relay 
relationship between the above three criminal judicial authorities, case file materials have 
a decisive impact on a criminal judgment. A criminal judgment to a certain extent has 
been reduced to the direct confirmation of a prosecution decision in this case. Obviously, 
it is difficult to implement the hearsay rule or the witness testifying system in this 
structure. 
On the one hand, in the criminal procedure structure centered on the pretrial 
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procedure, a People’s Court is only the last operator of an assembly line with a public 
security authority, a People's Procuratorate and a People's Court punishing crimes hand 
in hand. Concretely speaking, the People’s Court is not engaged in independent review 
and judgment to a criminal prosecution standing in a neutral stance, but fills the role of 
locating and making up the deficiencies in the issue of punishing crimes and 
hypocritically makes the final and authoritative determination to the criminal 
prosecution through the formal criminal trial, and then finishes the last step of criminal 
sanction under the legal procedures. In this case, it is unlikely for a People’s Court to turn 
a blind eye to evidence submitted by a public security authority and a People's 
Procuratorate. Certainly, the court also will not exclude the records of testimony of 
witnesses that belong to hearsay evidence and can take an important role in proving 
criminal facts at the risk of offending the public security authority and the People's 
Procuratorate. After all, if the public security authority and the People's Procuratorate 
have strong evidence to prove criminal facts and the People’s Court is able to determine 
that the criminal prosecution is correct, it will be not of great significance whether the 
court excludes the inadmissible records of testimony of witnesses. 
On the other hand, in the criminal procedure structure centered on the pretrial 
procedure, a defendant’s fate is not determined by a People’s Court’s criminal trial 
activities but by prosecution authorities. When a prosecution decision and materials 
submitted by a People's Procuratorate actually have a pre-determined effect on the 
judgment of a People’s Court, the court will let the procuratorial organs to read out the 
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records of testimony of witnesses in court in place of a witness testifying. In other words, 
the court would rather trust the authenticity of the records of testimony of witnesses 
submitted by the prosecution authorities than thoroughly review the exclusionary 
application of the defense party and then summon a witness to testify in court. 
 
4. Formalistic Trial 
From a legal principle, because a judge experiences the whole process of adducing 
evidence, cross examination and debate between prosecution and defense, and a criminal 
court is a “sound proof room” free from invasion of a variety of “external noises”, he or 
she can calmly deliberate all evidence and make a more comprehensive and objective 
evaluation about the opinions of both parties, and thus make a more reasonable and 
accurate judgment on the case. Moreover, as previously noted, fair trial can make court 
judgments more acceptable by both parties. Perhaps because of that, China regarded 
criminal trial mode reform as a breakthrough point of criminal justice reform in the mid-
1990s. 
With the continuous progress of the adversary system trial mode reform in China, 
the past bad situations, such as “judgment before trial” and the limited distinction 
between prosecution and trial, have improved a lot, but the weakened trial function, the 
formalistic court trial and other chronic illness still have not been completely eradicated, 
and China still has not formed a court culture that a judge makes a decision merely 
according to the cross-examination and debate between prosecution and defense in court. 
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Firstly, as mentioned earlier as in the assembly-line style of the criminal procedure 
structure, the court trial to a certain extent has been degraded to a confirmation process 
of a prosecution decision. Since the results of criminal procedure has been defined in 
advance, a People’s Court would rather make a decision according to a prosecution 
decision or case file materials provided by a People’s Procuratorate than get engaged in 
tedious trial. Secondly, due to the lack of the hearsay evidence rule and the prevalence of 
transferring case file materials, the link between the prosecution case files and the court 
has not been completely cut off, which leads to the following undesirable effects: (1) the 
evidence adduced by both parties and their opinions in the court debate cannot exert 
considerable influence on the judgment conclusion; (2) the formation of criminal 
adjudication is not usually based on the impression made by a judge according to the 
evidence adduced by both parties and their opinions in the court debate, but on the fruit 
of going over files outside the courtroom. Finally, from the surface, a criminal courtroom 
is always engaged in hearing, and a written sentence is also made by a collegial panel or 
a sole-judge bench. However, because of the judicial committee, the examination and 
approval of cases, the requesting instructions of cases and other judicial systems, a 
collegial panel or a sole-judge bench often cannot exercise a real adjudication authority 
in their own cases. This is the phenomenon of “real hearers without adjudicating and real 
adjudicators without hearing” in China’s criminal trial. When hearing judges fail to 
directly make corresponding judgments on basis of the contents of hearing, it is unlikely 
for them to have enough impetus to prevent a People’s Procuratorate from adducing the 
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record of testimony of a witness made by the investigative organs and directly summon 
a witness to appear before court. 
On the one hand, if an adjudication conclusion is derived from outside the courtroom, 
the contents and process of criminal trial will be of little significance. In that case, a judge 
will have no interest in carefully considering whether a criminal trial process is in full 
compliance with the standards of procedural justice. From a trial judge’s point of view, 
since he or she cannot decide the final result of a case anyway, he or she would rather 
perfunctorily deal with cases rather than thanklessly or hypocritically conducts tedious 
court trial in accordance with the standards of procedural justice. Under the influence of 
this mindset, the trial judge is more willing to quickly and conveniently finish criminal 
trial and regards a witness testifying that may cause delays in trial as an encumbrance. 
Thus, the trial judge lets a prosecutor read out the record of testimony of a witness in 
court, and rarely summon a witness to appear before court in accordance with the defense 
party’s request in judicial practice. Even if a witness can occasionally appear before court, 
the courtroom would rather be convinced of the legitimacy, authenticity and reliability 
of the record of testimony unilaterally made by the investigative organs than adopt the 
statement of a witness who is in court. Particularly, the courtroom will not adopt a 
witness’s testimony in court which is in contradiction with the record of testimony of the 
witness. 
On the other hand, when the judgment conclusion is finally decided by a superior 
court, the judicial committee, the president of the Court, and other external authoritative 
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force of the courtroom, it is unlikely for the trial judge to challenge their conclusion. 
However, those out-of-courtroom judges who do not experience the trial process clearly 
more concern about the correctness of the final results of criminal procedure, and do not 
care too much about the legitimacy of criminal trial process. Therefore, so long as the 
crime facts can be verified, the courtroom will use a record of testimony of a witness 
adduced by the People's Procuratorate as a basis for deciding a case, and does not care 
whether a witness testifies in court. 
5. The Misunderstanding of Finding Truth 
To correctly solve the issue of conviction and sentencing, a judge must regard the 
ascertained truth in criminal cases as the basis for judgment; otherwise the judge may 
make an erroneous judgment and harm judicial credibility and violate the lawful rights 
and interests of people. In view of this, Article 51 of the 2012 CPL (P. R. C) provides that 
a sentence of the People's Court must be consistent with the truth, and when truth is 
withheld intentionally, liability shall be investigated. However, under the influence of the 
ideology of seeking truth from facts and the epistemology of dialectical materialism, as 
found in the former criminal procedure law, the criminal trial procedure in the 2012 CPL 
(P. R. C) also puts an excessive emphasis on discovering the truth in a case. For example, 
to ascertain the truth, Article 50 of the 2012 CPL (P. R. C) provides that judges, prosecutors, 
and criminal investigators must, under legal procedures, gather various types of evidence 
that can prove the guilt or innocence of a criminal suspect or defendant and the gravity 
of the crime. According to Article 186 and 189 of the 2012 CPL (P. R. C), judges may 
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forwardly question a defendant, a witness, or expert during the trial. Article 191 of the 
2012 CPL (P. R. C) provides that a People's Court may investigate and verify evidence by 
crime scene investigation, examination, seizure, impoundment, forensic identification or 
evaluation, property inquiry, freezing of property, and other measures, if a collegial panel 
has any doubt about evidence during a court session. In light of Article 243 of the 2012 
CPL (P. R. C), when a People's Court discovers that there are any definite errors in 
findings of fact or application of law in an effective sentence or ruling of the court, the 
People’s Court may conduct the trial supervision procedures on its own and retry the 
original case. 
Objectively, the preference for truth-seeking does not mean that it is not good for 
China’s judges. After all, the clearer the facts of a case are means the less likely there is an 
error in the criminal judgment, and the impartiality and authority of the criminal trial 
will be fully guaranteed. It is unfortunate that the court must be subject to legal restraints 
when ascertaining criminal facts. Within a specified time and space, the court is not likely 
to completely ascertain the truth in a case, which means that the facts used as a basis of 
judgment are only the facts admitted at the legal level and do not necessarily equal the 
original appearance of criminal facts. Because the court cannot necessarily fully find out 
the original appearance of criminal facts, why should the judgment of the court be 
accepted and complied with? Obviously, to make the facts used as a basis of judgment 
acceptable, the criminal trial must abide by rules that manifest justice. Furthermore, 
although the court cannot necessarily find out the truth in a case in light of the standards 
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of a fair trial (and sometimes the fair trial even hinders the finding out of the truth), the 
facts that a court determines in a fair trial are acceptable facts, and judgments based on a 
fair trial are acceptable and convincing. Conversely, if the court ignores the legitimacy of 
trial procedure to find out the truth, even if the court can discover the complete truth and 
make an absolutely correct judgment, the legitimacy and acceptability of the judgment 
will be damaged. Only just from this perspective, the witness testifying system can have 
sufficient living space.  
Consequently, the preference for an excessive emphasis on the truth will inevitably 
exert an adverse influence on the implementation of the witness testifying system in 
China’s criminal courts. If a court excessively emphasizes the truth, it is not necessary, to 
a certain extent, for the court to summon a witness to testify in court. For example, in the 
case of the authenticity of a witness’s testimony, it is difficult to convey that the witness’s 
statement in court is necessarily more reliable than the witness’s statement in the 
transcript of questioning undertaken by an investigative authority. The reason a modern 
state ruled by law stresses that a witness must testify in court is that the primary value of 
a witness testifying is not about how to find out the truth but about how to protect the 
defendant’s right to cross-examine and, thus, to a fair trial in modern criminal procedure. 
Although a witness testifying in court objectively contributes to finding out the truth, this 
is only the incidental function of maintaining a fair trial. We cannot negate the value of 
witness testimony in maintaining a fair trial because of the reliability of the transcript of 
questioning. Otherwise, we will be putting the proverbial cart before the horse. 
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Furthermore, the foundation will be laid for a witness testifying in court only when 
judges are convinced of the value of a witness testifying to protect the fairness of a trial. 
If judges consider that the only value of a witness testifying is to find out the truth, the 
necessity of summoning a witness to testify will decline significantly. However, in 
judicial practice, many judges are accustomed to treating the issue of witness testimony 
only from the angle of finding out the truth. They deem that a witness testifying is only 
a legal form as opposed to the authenticity of a witness’s testimony, and the final purpose 
of the witness testifying is to ensure the authenticity of a witness’s testimony, otherwise 
it is not necessary to emphasize the legal form. In other words, if the authenticity of the 
record of testimony of a witness can be validated, it is not necessary for the court to 
summon a witness to testify in court. Therefore, during a court trial, many judges would 
rather make a public prosecutor read out the record of testimony of a witness than 
summon witnesses to accept the questioning of both parties in court. 
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